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HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
OF A RISKY ASSET: A NOTE
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a formal proof that the joint presence of hetero-
geneous expectations and restrictions on short sales of risky assets
causes an upward bias in the risky asset's equilibrium price (as opposed
to that which would have prevailed under no restriction on short sales).
This upward price bias is an increasing function of the degree of hetero-
geneity in information set across investors. Our proof differs in that a
general class of concave utility function is assumed rather than a
specific form of utility function such as the constant absolute risk
aversion utility function.

I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to present a formal proof, without
recourse to a specific form of utility function, that the joint presence
of heterogeneous expectations and restrictions on short sales causes an
upward bias in the risky asset's equilibrium price as opposed to that
which would have prevailed under no restriction on short sales; and this
upward bias increases when the degree of heterogeneity in information set
across investors increases.
II. THEORY
HA. Assumptions
The economy is described as follows:
1) There are two assets: one risky asset and one risk-free asset.
For simple analysis, the price of risk-free asset is assumed to be always
1 (without loss of generality).
2) The return on the risky asset follows a continuous-time stochas-
tic (Wiener) process:
dP
t
—•
- u dt + a dZ (1)
t
where P is the price of the risky asset at time t; u is the instantaneous
expected rate of return for the risky asset; a is the instantaneous stan-
dard deviation of the risky asset's rate of return; and dZ is a standard
Wiener process.
3) Investors (denoted by subscript or superscript k=*l,...,K) are risk
averse price takers, maximizing individual expected utility of lifetime
consumption. They have heterogeneous expectations about y, but have com-
plete agreement on a. This "partial" heterogeneous expectations assump-
tion arises from the continuous-time return generating process. In other
-2-
words, investors observe the realized return "continuously," and conse-
quently agree on the variability of the stochastic return (see Williams
[6] and Merton [3]). However, investors can have different estimates for
k th
the risky asset's expected return; and y is denoted as the k investor's
subjective estimate for the risky asset's expected return.
A) In order to emphasize that short sales of risky assets are costly,
it is assumed that information-motivated short sales of the risky asset
are not allowed. The ability of investors to sell securities short
without incurring transaction cost is severely limited by market practices
2
such as escrow account and margine requirement. Furthermore, traders on
the floor are not even allowed to sell a security short unless the last
transaction of the security at the exchange recorded a price increase, or
"uptick." As would be expected by these institutional barriers, the short
3
interest of the New York Stock Exchange has been less than 0.3 percent of
the total number of shares outstanding at the Exchange (N.Y.S.E. Fact
4
Book). Therefore, the assumption of no short sale should be acceptable
as a first approximation to represent substantial transaction cost
incurred by short sales of risky assets.
I IB. Optimal Consumption and Investment Decision
Given these assumptions, the investor's optimization system at time
t, 0<t<T, is described as:
T
MAX E*[J Uk(C^ s )ds + Vk(w£,T)] (2)
|C
t
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t )
subject to
dW
t
= W
t+dt " W t
= N
t
P
t
(yk
dt + a dZ) " C tdt (3)
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where E is the conditional expectation operator; U, is the utility
k kfunction (U' > and U" < 0); C is consumption; N denotes the number
of the risky asset; V, is the bequest function which is also assumed to
be strictly concave; WV represents investor's wealth; and all other
variables are as defined as before. For simplicity, all investors are
assumed to face the same time horizon, T. In this optimization system,
(3) represents the budget constraint, and (4) represents the restric-
tion on short sales of the risky asset.
By the Bellman principle of optimality, the objective function is
expressed as:
J
k (Wk ,t) = MAX Ek[U (C^t) + Jk (W^
+d(.,t+dt)] (5)
.k „ki{<?.?
r<
where J (•) is also strictly concave, and is referred to as the derived
utility function of wealth; and (5) is also subject to the same con-
It
straints (3) and (4). By expanding J in the right hand side of (5) in
a Taylor series about W and t, the Hamiton-Jacobi equation of dynamic
optimality is derived to be:
9 - MAX {U. (Ck ,t) + Jk + Jk Ek [dWk ] +T-Jk E
k [dWk ]
2
} (6)
, ,
l k t t wtt 2wwtt J
n k
where (dt) = i3 if n > 3/2; dt is suppressed for simple expression; J
k k Jc
and J are first derivatives of J with respect to t and VT", respectively;
k k Jc
and J is the second derivative of J with respect to w . Since (6) is
ww r t
subject to the constraints (3) and (4), the optimization system can be
expressed as:
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= MAX (U, (Ck t) - J k + Jk [Nk P^ u
k
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k
] + | Jk (Nk ) 2 a 2 P 2 + X k Nk}
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where \ is Che Lagrangian mulciplier for Che shore sale conscrainc. The
firsc order condicions for (7) are:
3U (c\c)
—£— : = J* > (8)k w
3C
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where subscripc C is, hereafcer, suppressed for simple noCaCion. In (9),
Che Kuhn-Tucker condicion should be held such ChaC:
\
k
= if Nk >
k k k k (10)
\
K
=
-J* P u > if N
K
=
ChaC is, X is Che shadow price of Che shore sale conscrainc, and Che
k k 5
condition for a positive \ is ChaC y < 0. Obviously, if invesCors are
pessimiscic abouC che risky assec, Chey do not hold Che risky assec long.
By (9) and (10), che opCimal number of Che risky assec, N , is:
"
jk
k
i vw fp 1 1 . c k N f.
N
k
=
W (11)
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k
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IIC. The Upward Bias in che Equilibrium Price of Risky AsseC
LeC N be Che CoCal number of Che risky assec. For Che analysis of
equilibrium price, invesCors are parcicioned inCo cwo groups: Che firsc
K~ invesCors (referred co as opcimiscic invesCors) hold che risky assec
long and Che remaining K - K~ invesCors (referred Co as pessimiscic
invescors) do noc hold Che risky assec.
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The market equilibrium condition is obtained by equating the aggre-
gate demand and the aggregate supply of the risky asset; and by solving
for P:
1 *0 k n
k
P =
N l e (\> (12)
k=l a
k k k th
where 8 = (-J /J ) is defined as the k investor's risk tolerance
w WW
(i.e., the inverse of absolute risk aversion).
If there were no restriction on short sales of the risky asset, pes-
simistic investors' expectations would have been incorporated into the
equilibrium price such that:
K k
p* - k T-
q1c (J
t> (13)
k=l o
where P* is the equilibrium price of the risky asset under no restriction
of short sales. Therefore, the price bias becomes:
-1 K k
k
P - P* = — S 9 (***•) > (14)
N k=K
Q
+l o
2
The price bias in (14) is positive because u < for k = K +1,...,K.
This result conforms to the earlier works by Miller [4], Figlewski [1],
and Jarrow [2] . However, this paper presents a formal proof without
recourse to a specific form of utility function (e.g., the constant ab-
solute risk aversion utility function by Figlewski and Jarrow)
.
I ID. Upward Price Bias and Heterogeneity of Information
Suppose that the individual's information variable, n
,
is drawn from
_ 2
the normal distribution with mean, Q, and variance, H . It is further
k k k k k
assumed that u is linear in n such that u = a + Bfl (6 > 0) . Then, u
-6-
2 2is also normally distributed with mean, a + (ST, and variance, S^H*"
.
Since y < t for pessimistic investors, the number of pessimistic
investors, K - K
,
is:
K Z (
V
gH
P J
) (15)
where Z is the cumulative distribution function for the standardized normal
random variable. For simplicity, let 9=8 for all k. Then, the
magnitude of the upward bias in the equilibrium price is expressed as:
a
where y is the average of pessimistic investors' estimates for the
risky asset's expected return. Equation (16) shows that the magnitude
of the upward bias in the equilibrium price increases when the degree
of heterogeneity in information set across investors, H, increases.
III. CONCLUSION
The valuation model developed in this paper has "formally" proved that
the joint presence of heterogeneous expectations and restrictions of short
sales results in an upward bias in the equilibrium price of risky assets;
and the magnitude of this upward price bias increases when the degree of
heterogeneity in information set across investors increases.
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FOOTNOTES
The assumptions of a single risky asset and the zero risk-free
rate are inconsequential to the final result of this paper.
2
In reality, brokers play the role of the security lender. The pro-
ceeds from short sales are held in the escrow account of the brokerage
house. In addition, brokers require an additional amount (currently
50% of the short sales proceeds) to be deposited (margin requirement)
.
See Rudd and Schroeder [5] for further discussion of transaction costs
associated with short sales.
3
The short interest refers to the number of shares sold short and
not covered.
4
In fact, most of these short sale transactions are generated by
non-information (technical) motives of specialists and exchange members
to meet the influx of public buy orders and to maintain "orderly"
markets. Note that these "liquidity-motivated" short sales are not
relevant to this paper's purpose.
If the risk-free rate is r, it can be shown that the investor does
not hold the risky asset if u < r.
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